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THE FAULT THAT LIES WITHIN OUR
CONTRACT LAW
George M. Cohen*
Scholars and courts typically describe and defend American contract
law as a system of strict liability, or liability without fault. Strict li-
ability generally means that the reason for nonperformance does not
matter in determining whether a contracting party breached. Strict
liability also permeates the doctrines of contract damages, under
which the reason for the breach does not matter in determining the
measure of damages, and the doctrines of contract formation, under
which the reason for failing to contract does not matter
In my Article, I take issue with the strict liability paradigm, as I
have in my prior work on contract law. In my view, the theoretical
justifications for strict liability as a general paradigm for contract
law oversimplify contractual intent, the relationship between intent
and fault, and the nature of contractual fault. Moreover, the strict
liability label is descriptively misleading, once one dips even
slightly below the surface of contract doctrine. Fault shows up
throughout contract law. Efforts to make contract law conform
more to the strict liability paradigm and exorcize fault are wrong-
headed. In any case, such efforts are doomed to fail. Fault may not
be the dominant feature of contract law, but it plays an inherent, in-
valuable, and ineluctable supporting part. Like other contract
rules, strict liability is merely a fault-based presumption. Determin-
ing the limits of that presumption means considering why parties
make contracts and why they do not perform them, in other words,
fault. Courts and scholars should acknowledge the role of fault and
think about how to use fault more effectively within the framework
of contract doctrine.
INTRODUCTION
The myth that contract law is a system of strict liability stubbornly per-
sists.' I seek to debunk this myth.2 In my view, the theoretical justifications
* Brokaw Professor of Corporate Law, University of Virginia School of Law. Thanks to
Umair Javed for research assistance and participants in the University of Virginia summer workshop
for helpful comments.
I. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, ch. I1, introductory note (1981) ("Con-
tract liability is strict liability.... The obligor is therefore liable in damages for breach of contract
even if he is without fault....").
2. This essay thus continues a recurrent theme in my writing on contract law. George M.
Cohen, Implied Terms and Interpretation in Contract Law, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
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for strict liability oversimplify contractual intent, the relationship between
intent and fault, and the nature of contractual fault. Moreover, the strict li-
ability label is descriptively misleading once one dips even slightly below
the surface of contract doctrine. Efforts to make contract law conform more
to the strict liability paradigm and exorcize fault are misguided. In any case,
such efforts are doomed to fail. Fault plays an inherent, invaluable, and ine-
luctable role in contract law.
I. STRICT LIABILITY IN CONTRACT LAW
The strict liability paradigm permeates classical contract law. Usually,
however, the explicit label "strict liability" appears only in connection with
the doctrines of performance and breach. Under these doctrines, failure in
any way to perform a contract breaches the contract, and subjects the
breaching party to liability, regardless of "fault."3 The paradigmatic case is a
seller who delivers goods that fail "in any respect to conform to the con-
tract. '4 Strict liability means that the contract provides a "warranty" of
results. In short, the reason for nonperformance does not matter.
If the doctrinal irrelevance of fault is the touchstone of strict liability,
then the other main areas of contract law-formation and damages-seem
to fit that paradigm as well. With respect to damages, Holmes long ago ar-
ticulated the strict liability view: just as the reason for nonperformance does
not matter in determining breach, the reason for the breach does not matter
in determining damages.6 An aggrieved party who can prove breach is enti-
tled to "compensation," which contract law generally defines as protecting
the expectation interest. Fault seems irrelevant to determining compensa-
tion.
Finally, although contract formation doctrine does not explicitly endorse
strict liability, it nevertheless also seems to comport with the strict liability
view. In this case, however, it is the reason for failing to contract, rather than
for failing to perform, that does not matter.8 Basic formation doctrine holds
ECONOMICS 78 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) [hereinafter Cohen, Interpreta-
tion]; George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1994)
[hereinafter Cohen, Fault Lines]; George M. Cohen, Finding Fault with Wonnell's "Two Contractual
Wrongs," 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 137 (2001) [hereinafter Cohen, Finding Fault]; George M. Cohen,
The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 941 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter Cohen, Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoffl.
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235 cmt. b ("[Alnything short of full per-
formance is a breach, even if the party who does not fully perform was not at fault...
4. U.C.C. § 2-601 (2005).
5. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 266 cmt. b, illus. 7 (contracting
party who warrants merchantability of a machine is liable for uncurable defect not due to fault of
seller and which seller did not know about).
6. Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 544 (1903). For a critique of this
view, see Cohen, Fault Lines, supra note 2.
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 344 cmt. a, 347 & cmt. a.
8. Technically the doctrine is one of strict nonliability rather than strict liability, but the idea
is essentially the same.
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that no contractual liability exists unless and until the parties agree.9 Just as
fault seems irrelevant to performance and compensation, so it seems irrele-
vant to "agreement."
The narrow explicit association of strict liability with contract perform-
ance and breach is puzzling. What sense would it make to call contract law a
strict liability regime if strict liability merely occupies the narrow doctrinal
space of performance while the reason for nonperformance matters for for-
mation and remedy? In fact, the justifications usually offered for strict
liability apply across contract law. These justifications are weak.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR STRICT LIABILITY
One can posit two broad types of justifications for strict liability: tradi-
tionalist and economic. A "traditionalist" justification derives strict liability
from two simple premises. First, contract law grounds liability in the mutual
consent of the contracting parties.'0 Second, fault is a social judgment dis-
tinct from consent." Unlike the tort law of accidents between strangers,
contract law allows the parties themselves to define the scope of liability,
removing, in theory, the need for social judgment (other than the social
judgment to enforce agreements according to the parties' intentions). The
only relevant fault is breach of any agreement the parties intended to make.
Fault thus merges with mutual intent; it is not an independent criterion of
liability12
Enforcing agreements according to mutual consent does not quite imply
strict liability, however. Suppose the parties intend that the reason for non-
performance matters in determining liability under their contract. A regime
that strictly enforces fault-based intent is not what we usually think of as
strict liability. Thus, a traditionalist justification of strict liability must de-
fend the proposition that the parties generally intend that the reason for
nonperformance does not matter. That proposition is, however, contestable,
as discussed below.
The economic justification starts from the same premise as the tradition-
alist justification-that courts should enforce agreements according to the
parties' mutual intentions-but grounds that premise differently. The eco-
nomic justification focuses on "facilitat[ing] the efforts of contracting
9. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1); E. Allen Farnsworth, Precontrac-
tual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLuM. L.
REV. 217, 221-22 (1987).
10. See, e.g., Curtis Bridgeman, Reconciling Strict Liability with Corrective Justice in Con-
tract Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 3013, 3034-35 (2007) (justifying strict liability under a theory of
corrective justice focusing on the wrongful loss of entitlements determined primarily by mutual
consent).
11. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLI-
GATION 4 (1981) (contrasting contract law, which focuses on the will of the parties, with tort law,
which focuses on "fairness").
12. For a more sophisticated philosophical approach to strict liability, see STEPHEN A.
SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 376-86 (2004).
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parties to maximize the joint gains ... from transactions."' 3 If courts do not
enforce contracts according to mutual intent, but instead try to "regulate"
the parties' behavior, for example, by injecting courts' "own notions" of
"fault" that conflict with the parties' preferences, joint gains will not be
maximized; thus, parties will contract around those restrictions if they can
and incur losses if they cannot.
4
Even if contracting parties do not expressly state a preference for strict
liability, economists would infer such a preference if it comports with effi-
ciency, on the assumption that most parties would prefer strict liability.
Economists generally offer three reasons why strict liability in contract is
efficient: superior risk bearing, litigation costs, and comparative institutional
competence. First, if promisors are usually in a better position than pro-
misees to bear risks that would make performance of their promises more
costly or less valuable, then strict liability is efficient because it generally
puts those risks on the superior risk bearer. 6 Second, fault-based liability
imposes higher litigation costs on the parties than strict liability, because
fault is more costly for courts to assess, and these costs outweigh the bene-
fits of a fault-based system. 7 Finally, contracting parties are better equipped
than the courts to make whatever fault determinations are desirable, and so
prefer informal enforcement to court enforcement unless they say other-
wise."
These reasons are not persuasive. As discussed below, the superior-risk-
bearer analysis actually supports a fault-based approach to contract law as a
whole, because the promisor is not always the better risk bearer. Further,
distinguishing cases in which the promisee is the better risk bearer is not
always unduly burdensome. Moreover, the litigation-cost advantage of strict
liability is far from clear. For example, courts under a fault-based approach
can easily limit the kinds of fault evidence that parties could introduce; fault
need not mean free-for-all. And the comparative institutional advantage ar-
gument that parties prefer that they, rather than courts, should make fault
judgments merely returns us to the problem of determining mutual intent.
III. THE UNCERTAINTY OF MUTUAL INTENT
Under both the traditionalist and economic justifications, the argument
for strict liability is stronger if mutual intent is easily determined and clearly
distinguishable from fault. Adopting a fault-based system of contract law in
13. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
YALE L.J. 541,544 (2003).
14. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 99 (7th ed. 2007).
15. Id. at 97.
16. Id. at 182.
17. E.g., Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73
CAL. L. REV. 1,31-32(1985).
18. E.g., Robert E. Scott, In (Partial) Defense of Strict Liability in Contract, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 1381, 1392-94 (2009).
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those circumstances would lead to illegitimate social judgments by courts
on the traditionalist view, and result in inefficient contracting around or fail-
ures to contract on the economic view.
Determining disputed mutual intent is inherently uncertain, however.
Mutual intent is an ideal. Contracting parties attempt to express mutual in-
tent, often in writing, but do so imperfectly. Contracts are largely a set of
private rules, and all rules require interpretation, stories that explain their
meaning in a particular situation. As unanticipated situations arise, disputes
requiring interpretation inevitably occur. Parties generally resolve these dis-
putes on their own, often driven by reputational concerns. When these
efforts fail, they bring their disputes to court. In litigated cases, the parties
typically contest the requirements of mutual intent. Contract law is another
set of rules, designed predominantly to help courts choose between compet-
ing versions of mutual intent. The very existence of contract law, therefore,
belies an easily determined mutual intent in disputed contracts. This is espe-
cially true for doctrines of formation and remedy, matters about which
contracting parties often say little.
One could argue that even if intent is uncertain in general, parties at
least intend courts to adopt strict liability rules. Intent about interpretive
methodology, which we might call procedural or secondary, contrasts with
substantive or primary intent, which is how parties should and should not
behave under the contract. Contracting parties may express preferences
about the methodology they want courts to use in ascertaining mutual intent.
For example, merger clauses direct courts to look only at the writing. Parties
do not, however, typically write "strict liability" clauses into their contracts.
Thus, focusing on secondary intent merely shifts the problem of uncertain
intent to a different place. Moreover, even explicit statements of secondary
intent do not preempt the need for interpretation. In fact, they often create an
additional interpretive question: when primary and secondary intent conflict,
• • 20
which takes priority?
The difference between primary and secondary intent is just one exam-
ple of a more general phenomenon: multiple intents. Contracting parties
often have more than one goal. They make multiple promises. Multifaceted
intent compounds the problem of contractual uncertainty. The more expres-
sions of intent, the more likely that disputes will arise over how to reconcile
or prioritize conflicting expressions.
19. See generally Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreward: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
20. See Cohen, Interpretation, supra note 2, at 96-97. Schwartz and Scott argue for the
priority of secondary over primary intent on theoretical (and to me unconvincing) grounds. Schwartz
& Scott, supra note 13, at 568-94. Similar questions arise in recent theories arguing that parties
often intend to rely on "fairness norms" (primary) but they intend these norms to be enforced pri-
vately rather than by courts (secondary). See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing
Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641 (2003). Suppose that parties do have that intention
(which is contestable in many cases). If one party violates a fairness norm, the other party may, in
violation of another norm, take the dispute to court. The theorists argue that courts should invariably
enforce the procedural norm rather than the substantive norm. Why?
1449June 2009]
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Another factor contributing to the uncertainty of intent is multiple
agents. Entities are parties to most contracts, and entities can act only
through agents. Different agents may negotiate a contract, draft the docu-
ments, approve the deal, and receive and evaluate the performance under the
agreement. Agency law resolves some questions of how to determine con-
tractual "intent," under such doctrines as apparent authority2 and imputed
knowledge.2 ' But the application of these doctrines is often uncertain, and in
any case, they do not address all issues of contractual intent involving
agents. In particular, many contract disputes arise when an entity's agents
who negotiated the contract are not the same ones seeking to enforce or es-
cape it later.23 When, for example, management changes, is the new
management bound by the intent of the old management?
Thus, we should be wary of theoretical justifications for strict liability
that depend on overly confident assertions of mutual intent. Otherwise, a
theory that supposedly favors judicial humility and encourages efficient con-
tracting instead fosters judicial hubris and causes inefficient interference
with contract. Acknowledging the uncertainty of intent opens the door to
fault.
IV. THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN FAULT AND INTENT
Just as the justifications for strict liability rely on relative certainty about
mutual intent, they also rely on a strong dichotomy between intent and fault.
But the uncertainty of intent blurs this dichotomy. When intent is uncertain,
fault can help inform intent in a variety of ways. Most obviously, parties
may expressly use fault concepts in their contracts, such as best efforts4 and
good faith clauses, which essentially invite courts to make fault-based
judgments in the event of a dispute.
Second, parties may intend to be governed by fault standards even if
they do not expressly say so. Courts often find fault standards to be implied
in the contract.26 Most commonly, in professional services contracts, courts
presume that the professional does not intend to guarantee results, and the
21. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (2005).
22. See, e.g., id. § 5.03 cmt. d(1). U.C.C. § 1-202(0 (2005) adopts a version of imputed
knowledge for organizations. Also, § 1-103 incorporates agency law.
23. See, e.g., Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981)
(discussing a dispute that arose when new management failed to continue prior unwritten price
protection policy); Int'l Telemeter Corp. v. Teleprompter Corp., 592 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1979) (discuss-
ing a dispute that arose when new management refused to proceed with negotiated settlement
agreement).
24. See generally KENNETH A. ADAMS, A MANUAL OF STYLE FOR CONTRACT DRAFTING 88-
94 (2004).
25. See, e.g., Channel Home Ctrs. v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding en-
forceable a contractual duty to bargain in good faith contained in a letter of intent).
26. The classic case is Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917) (Car-
dozo, J.).
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client agrees to accept the professional standard of care.27 In agency con-
tracts, courts imply duties of care and loyalty.28 Courts often apply similar
standards to other service contracts.29
Third, contracting parties often draft terms designed to discourage cer-
tain conduct. Although these terms do not explicitly mention fault, fault may
help explain the purpose behind these terms and therefore facilitate their
interpretation. For example, "satisfaction clauses" in construction contracts
protect owners against shoddy work by builders, but courts often limit an
owner's ability to reject a builder's work if that purpose would not be
served. 3° Contingency payments discourage shirking, but if satisfactory ef-
fort occurs, courts sometimes allow recovery under the quantum meruit
doctrine even if the contingency has not occurred."
Fourth, fault can help resolve a conflict between plausible competing in-
terpretations of intent by focusing on narrower grounds. Courts may be
more confident about whether the parties intended to prohibit specific con-
duct in a particular circumstance than about which of two interpretations
ought to prevail more generally.32
Finally, fault may be inconsistent with contractual intent. Contracts may
expressly or impliedly limit the application of fault. For example, courts
interpret express and implied warranties as strict liability standards.33 Simi-
larly, courts interpret option contracts-4 and (more controversially and less
consistently) employment-at-will contracts to give absolute discretion to one
27. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52 cmt. b (1998)
(stating that a lawyer is not a guarantor of successful outcome).
28. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01, 8.08 (2005).
29. For example, in Milau Associates, Inc. v. North Avenue Development Corp., 368 N.E.2d
1247 (N.Y. 1977), the court rejected the application of the implied warranty of fitness to a contract
for the installation of a sprinkler system, finding instead that "unless the parties have contractually
bound themselves to a higher standard of performance, reasonable care and competence owed gen-
erally by practitioners in the particular trade or profession defines the limits of an injured party's
justifiable demands." Id. at 1250. The court added that "[gliven the predominantly service-oriented
character of the transaction, neither the code nor the common law of this State can be read to imply
an undertaking to guard against economic loss stemming from the nonnegligent performance by a
construction firm which has not contractually bound itself to provide perfect results." Id. at 1251.
30. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 228 (1981); Morin Bldg. Prods. Co.
v. Baystone Constr., Inc., 717 F.2d 413 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.).
31. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 40.
32. Cf Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provi-
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968) (arguing that good faith should
be defined with reference to specific acts done in bad faith).
33. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2-315 (2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 266 cmt. b, illus. 7.
34. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.23, at 176 (4th ed. 2004). Economic
scholars have become enamored with analogizing many contract terms and doctrines to options. See,
e.g., Avery Wiener Katz, The Option Element in Contracting, 90 VA. L. REV. 2187 (2004). While the
analogies can be enlightening, one danger of them is that they too casually smuggle the strict
liability connotation of options to other areas where plausible arguments can be made for fault-
based approaches. That is, option analogies put the strict liability rabbit in the hat.
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or both parties, thereby making fault irrelevant." On the other hand, some-
times fault trumps inconsistent intent to further a different goal of contract
law, especially the protection of third parties.36
The above discussion, however, suggests several caveats against too
quickly assuming inconsistency between intent and fault.37 Sometimes what
appears to be a conflict between fault and intent may in reality reflect differ-
ent interpretations of uncertain intent." Moreover, terms limiting fault
require interpretation about how far these limits extend. The parties' en-
dorsement of fault in one part of their relationship may evidence their intentS • 39
to extend fault more broadly rather than to limit its application. Fault con-siderations may reappear if the reason for excluding fault does not apply. 4
V. THE MEANING OF CONTRACTUAL FAULT
The recognition that intent is often consistent with fault does not estab-
lish whether, in the face of uncertain intent, courts ought to presume that the
parties intend fault-based liability. One argument for presuming such intent
is that contractual fault is inefficient conduct that parties would want to dis-
courage. Economists have identified three types of contractual fault: failure
to take precautions, failure to mitigate, and opportunism.' Precaution taking
is most generally associated with the superior-risk-bearer concept, which
assigns contracting risks to the party better able to bear those risks, and pre-
sumes that the parties intended this result. Though itself fault based, the
superior-risk-bearer idea could, as discussed above, support strict liability if
the promisor is so often the better precaution taker that the benefits of mak-
ing individualized fault assessments are not worth the costs.
35. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 34, § 7.17, at 499-500.
36. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (stating when contract terms are
unenforceable on grounds of public policy).
37. Compare, e.g., Cohen, Interpretation, supra note 2, at 84-85 (discussing whether good
faith is better viewed as a mandatory or default rule), with VICTOR GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT
LAW (2006) (criticizing court interpretations of good faith as inconsistent with mutual intent).
38. The classic statement remains Cardozo's: "From the conclusion that promises may not
be treated as dependent to the extent of their uttermost minutiae without a sacrifice of justice, the
progress is a short one to the conclusion that they may not be so treated without a perversion of
intention." Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y 1921).
39. In a recent case explicitly referencing the strict liability principle, a court found that a
commercial landlord breached a contractual obligation to secure tenant consent in connection with
selling the property, in part because the parties used "best efforts" clauses elsewhere in the contract
but not in connection with the tenant approval obligation. West Willow-Bay Court, LLC v. Robino-
Bay Court Plaza, LLC, No. 2742-VCN, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 154, at *14 (Ch. Nov. 2, 2007). An
alternative interpretation would be that the "best efforts" clauses reflected the parties' view of the
landlord's obligations generally rather than exceptions to strict liability.
40. Thus, insurance contracts are usually considered strict liability obligations, yet the contra
prferentem doctrine deems the insurer at fault for drafting ambiguous contracts, see, e.g., JOHN
EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 88G, at 483-84 (4th ed. 2001), and the bad faith
breach doctrine punishes insurers who unreasonably try to avoid their contractual obligations, see,
e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 34, § 12.8, at 762.
41. See Cohen, Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff, supra note 2, at 944-61.
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In many cases, the promisor is in a good position to take cost-effective
precautions that would reduce or eliminate the risk of nonperformance.
These precautions range from quality control to backup supplies to purchas-
ing insurance to not promising in the first place. In many other cases,
however, the promisee is better able to take precautions, for example by re-
42straining reliance or assisting the promisor.
But precaution taking is merely one aspect of contractual fault, and notS 43
always the most important. For example, the parties may be equally able to
take precautions or there may be no cost-effective precautions that either
party can take. Precaution taking matters most when contract failures most
resemble unintentional torts: accidental contracts and accidental contingen-
cies.4 An accidental contract is one the parties should not have made; that
is, it was jointly unprofitable at the time of formation, but one or both par-
ties did not know that. An accidental contingency is an event arising after
contract formation that makes the contract jointly unprofitable and therefore
one that, from an economic perspective, the parties should no longer per-
form. Both cases naturally raise the question whether the contracting parties
could have taken reasonable precautions to prevent the contract or the con-
tingency, for example by investing more in information.
On the other hand, if the contract is jointly profitable at the outset and
remains so, but a "regret contingency" occurs that makes the contract less
profitable for one side, then mitigation and opportunism often become more
41important than precaution taking. Mitigation is an action, taken after a con-
tingency occurs, that reduces the losses caused by that contingency, such as
obtaining substitute performance. Contract doctrine focuses solely on pro-
46
misee mitigation as a limitation on damages. Often, however, the promisor
is the superior mitigator. For example, promisors can repair or replace their
defective performance, or purchase market substitutes. Just as the case for
strict liability is stronger when the promisor is more likely the superior risk
bearer, so it is stronger when the promisor is more likely the superior miti-
gator (the superior mitigator concept being merely a variation on superior
risk bearer). If, however, the promisee is often the superior mitigator, as the
mitigation of damages doctrine recognizes, the case for strict liability is
weakened.
42. See, e.g., Ariel Porat, A Comparative Fault Defense in Contract Law, 107 MIcH. L. REv.
1397, 1398-1403 (2009).
43. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(17) (2005) (defining "fault" broadly as "a default, breach, or
wrongful act or omission"); id. § 2-613 cmt. 1 (fault includes both negligence and willful wrong).
See generally Cohen, Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff, supra note 2.
44. See Cohen, Fault Lines, supra note 2, at 1245-52 (discussing accidental contracts); id. at
1258-65 (discussing accidental contingencies).
45. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General
Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 972-73 (1983).
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (1981). The Restatement recognizes
the "willful failure to mitigate" as a form of bad faith. Id. § 205 cmt. e.
1453June 20091
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Apart from precautions and mitigation, there is another form of contrac-S 41
tual fault that plays a large role in contracts and contract law: opportunism.
One party in a contractual relationship often takes, or fails to take, some
action that creates the possibility of loss to the other; that is, one party be-
comes vulnerable to opportunistic expropriation by the other, with
"opportunistic" defined as contrary to the parties' agreement, contractual
norms, or conventional morality.48 In the paradigmatic case, one party makes
a relationship-specific investment, leaving the investing party vulnerable to
threats by the other to deprive him of his investment.49 Specific investments
can occur before or after contract formation.50 Similarly, a party may intend
to act opportunistically from the outset or form the intent after the specific
investment occurs.
Opportunistic behavior can occur even absent specific investments. All
opportunism requires is some change in position ("reliance") growing out of
the contractual relationship that exposes one party to loss that the other par-
ty can intentionally impose. This vulnerability can arise in various ways. If
performance is sequential, one party may provide a benefit to the other party
who then tries to keep that benefit without performing his reciprocal obliga-
tions.5 Or one party may forego other contracting opportunities, which then
become unavailable when market conditions change. 2 Or one party may
provide information to the other party, who then uses the information to the
first party's disadvantage.53 Or one party may act negligently and the other
party knowingly tries to exploit rather than correct the problem. Finally,
contract terms and contract law doctrines often create the potential for op-
portunistic exploitation by a party seeking to apply those rules to unintended
situations."5
As with the other forms of fault, strict liability makes sense if the promi-
sor is almost always the most likely opportunist. But that is not the case.
Moreover, as I have argued in previous work, the better precaution taker and
47. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 14, at 93-94; Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior
and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REv. 521 (1981).
48. Cohen, Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff, supra note 2, at 957.
49. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 13, at 559-62.
50. See, e.g., Cohen, Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff, supra note 2, at 960-61.
51. POSNER, supra note 14, at 93-94.
52. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1981); id. § 90
cmt. d, illus. 10.
53. See, e.g., Cohen, Finding Fault, supra note 2, at 150.
54. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 49 (stating that an offeree cannot
accept beyond deadline if offeror negligently delayed in communicating the offer but offeree knows
or has reason to know of the delay); id. § 153 (allowing relief for unilateral mistake if the other
party had reason to know of the mistake or his fault caused it).
55. I disagree with the argument that formalist approaches to contract law create less possi-
bility for opportunistic behavior than alternative approaches. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 13,
at 585-89, 601-05.
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the most likely opportunist are often different parties. Contract disputes,
then, present questions not only about which party is the best precaution
taker, but also which party is the best mitigator and which is the most likely
opportunist. The case for strict liability is strongest when the promisor is all
three. In my view, however, the likelihood that the promisee is more at fault
on one or more of these criteria is high enough in litigated cases that strict
liability is not generally justified.
VI. FAULT IN CONTRACT DOCTRINE
If, as I have argued, mutual intent and efficiency often support fault-
based rather than strict liability, contract doctrine does not stand in the way.
In fact, the language and architecture of contract doctrine strongly reflect
the pervasive influence of fault.
Contract doctrine contains numerous direct expressions of fault. The Re-
statement and UCC include the following terms, all of which naturally invite
a fault inquiry: best efforts, diligence," fault," fraudulent,6 good (and bad)
faith, 61 injustice (and justice and unjust),62 justified,63 know and reason toko,4 •• 65 66 666
knowTM mitigate, negligent,66 precaution, reasonable, 61 unconscionable,69
and willful.7° The ubiquity of fault terms strongly suggests a vital role for
fault in contract doctrine, though the bewildering and seemingly ad hoc va-
riety of terms scattered across the doctrinal landscape obscures the extent
and nature of that role.
Two prime examples of rules in the Restatement expressly incorporating
fault standards are section 20 on misunderstanding and section 201 on inter-
pretation.7' Interestingly, these two sections not only directly link mutual
intent to fault but adopt a relative fault standard. Under these essentially
56. In my earlier work, I argued that deterring opportunism should take priority over deter-
ring negligence in contract law when one party is the least-cost avoider and the other is the most
likely opportunist. See Cohen, Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff, supra note 2.
57. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-306 (2005).
58. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 54(2)(a), 56, 67.
59. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-702(2).
61. See, e.g., id. § 2-1030).
62. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90.
63. See, e.g., id § 164.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 71-74.
65. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. b.
66. See, e.g., id. § 19 cmt. c.
67. See, e.g., id. § 66.
68. See, e.g., id. § 228.
69. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (2005).
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261. cmt. d.
71. Id. §§20,201.
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similar doctrines, if the parties agree on a meaning, that meaning prevails. If
they attach "different meanings" to their agreement, no contract exists if
neither is at fault or both are equally at fault. 72 If, however, one party's fault
exceeds the other's, a contract exists and the meaning of the party whose
fault is greater loses. 3 Fault is determined by whether a party "knows" or
has "reason to know" of the other's meaning. One might be tempted to dis-
miss sections 20 and 201 as minor and uniquely fault-based doctrines. But
the fact that they address how courts should handle uncertain intent makes
them foundational.
One might also ask how these doctrines square with the objective theory
of contract. The objective theory is based on manifestations that have "ob-
jective" meanings. 4 The "attached meanings" of sections 20 and 201 seem
subjective rather than objective. Nevertheless, sections 20 and 201 are con-
sistent with the objective theory, if that theory is understood in fault terms.
The objective theory presumes that when one party manifests some intent
and then later asserts a different intent, either he negligently or intentionally
misled the other party originally, or is acting opportunistically now.7 That
is, the party manifesting intent, i.e., the promisor, "knows or has reason to
,,76
know that the other party may infer from his conduct that he assents, pre-
cisely the standard of sections 20 and 201. If, on the other hand, the
promisee's fault exceeds that of the manifesting promisor, the justification
for the objective theory disappears.7
Even when a doctrine is not expressed in fault language, its purpose may
be to discourage opportunistic or negligent behavior. For example, the stat-
ute of frauds,78 the parol evidence rule,79 and the consideration doctrine ° all
aim, at least to some extent, to deter assertions of false promises. Similarly,
the market damage rule discourages opportunistic breaches to take
72. Id. §§ 20(1) & cmt. d, 201(3).
73. See, e.g., Hub Recycling, Inc. v. Louis Usdin Co., 106 B.R. 372 (D.N.J. 1989) (applying
§ 201 to interpret Pollution Exclusion Clause against insurance company on ground that it knew
insured's intended meaning). The Restatement rules on trade and other usages also incorporate a
"knows or has reason to know" standard. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 220, 221, 222;
see also U.C.C. § 1-303(d) (stating that trade usage of which the parties "are or should be aware"
can be used to interpret the agreement); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (exclud-
ing term of standardized agreement if party who drafts it "has reason to believe" that other party
would not have agreed to a particular term if he knew about it).
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 cmt. b.
75. Cohen, Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff, supra note 2, at 979-80.
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(2). The objective theory also uses the term
"justify" to incorporate fault considerations. See id. § 2 ("A promise is a manifestation of intention
... so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made."); id. § 24
(similar definition of offer).
77. For a recent critique of the objective theory sounding some similar themes, see Lawrence
M. Solan, Contract as Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 353 (2007).
78. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 34, § 6. 1, at 356.
79. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the
Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 533 (1998).
80. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 14, at 100.
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advantage of a change in market price while encouraging mitigation." Many
contract doctrines, then, incorporate fault-based presumptions, even if not
obviously directed at fault. Exceptions or alternative doctrines cover situa-
tions that do not fit the presumptions. Flexibility in doctrinal choice presents
opportunities for courts to make relative fault assessments. In what follows,
I offer some representative examples of fault in each of the main doctrinal
areas of performance, damages, and formation.
With respect to performance, the doctrine of impracticability invariably
crops up as a counterexample to strict liability. This is somewhat surpris-
ing. 2 The traditional presumption of impracticability, that neither party
anticipated and protected against some risk,83 emphasizes mutual innocence
of the parties, not fault.8 The traditional approach, however, takes an unduly
narrow view of fault. Impracticability reflects a concern with promisee fault
other than precaution taking. Specifically, courts tend to excuse a promisor
from bearing some risk if the promisee is the superior mitigator, or perhaps
the superior insurer.1
6
Even if one disagrees that the impracticability doctrine itself is fault
based, fault inevitably influences the doctrine. Because of uncertainty in
determining what relevant risks the parties assumed when contracting, im-
practicability doctrine gives promisors a vehicle for claiming excuse
opportunistically-for example, by falsely alleging that performance was
truly impracticable. The doctrine tries to reduce the risk of promisor oppor-
tunism that it introduces. For one thing, courts tend to reject promisor
claims of excuse when the promisor can easily mitigate by providing a sub-
stitute performance." On the other hand, courts are more willing to grant
excuse when the changed circumstances are less subject to promisor ma-
nipulation, such as in cases involving the promisor's death88 or destruction
of a particular thing. 9 Moreover, the doctrine allows the promisee to chal-lenge the application of the doctrine by proving promisor "fault. ' 9°
81. Cohen, Fault Lines, supra note 2, at 1319-20.
82. A more apt example is the substantial performance doctrine and Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v.
Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921), discussed in Cohen, Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff, supra note
2, at 990-1000, as well as in a number of papers in this Symposium.
83 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).
84. See SMITH, supra note 12, at 383.
85. See GOLDBERG, supra note 37, at 334-39 (arguing that excuse is justified to encourage
promisee to economize on getting nonfungible substitute).
86. See POSNER, supra note 14, at 105-08. For a critique of the superior insurer theory, see
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 130-36 (1993).
87. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-614(1) (2005).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 262.
89. Id. § 263.
90. See U.C.C. § 2-613 ("Where ... goods suffer casualty without fault of either party ...
the contract is avoided ...."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 ("Where ... a party's
performance is made impracticable without his fault ... his duty to render that performance is dis-
charged ...."); id. § 265 ("Where ... a party's principal purpose is substantially frustrated without
his fault ... his remaining duties to render performance are discharged ...."). Somewhat
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The existence and structure of excuse doctrine are neither accidental nor
aberrational. The pattern found here recurs throughout contract doctrine.
Some rule aims to deter faulty behavior by one party, but in doing so creates
an incentive for faulty behavior by the other party. Contract law then creates
an exception or limitation to deter that behavior, and so on. Regardless of
whether the doctrine uses express fault terms, the doctrine as a whole con-
tains both fault-based presumptions and doctrinal vehicles by which the
parties can introduce fault assessments to overcome those presumptions.
With respect to contract damages, I have previously argued that the
choice between different measures of damages (expectation, reliance, and
restitution), as well as the limitations on expectation damages, are best un-
derstood as doctrines enabling courts to make relative fault assessments.9 In
fact, damages doctrines are best suited to dividing liability when both par-
ties are at fault. In light of this crucial role of damages in facilitating relative
fault assessments, the resistance of courts to "penalty clauses," which pre-
clude such assessments, is eminently sensible, despite the continued
objection of many economic scholars.
Finally, formation doctrine seems to mirror performance doctrine in that
it presumes promisee fault in failing to secure an agreement, just as per-
formance doctrine presumes promisor fault in failing to perform. But
various formation doctrines allow fault considerations when this presump-
tion does not hold. For example, the "know or has reason to know" standard
92of sections 20 and 201 appears in several offer and acceptance rules. The
"acceptance by silence" doctrine, for example, uses the standard both to
encourage precaution taking by promisor-offerees in acquiring relevant in-
formation and to discourage opportunistic ignorance of potentially harmful
93information. By the same token, a promisee cannot forestall the other par-
ty's ability to acquire further information necessary to evaluate the deal by
opportunistically insisting on the deal's closure and enforceability when the
promisee has reason to know the other party is still investigating.94
Strict liability theorists might point to the absence of a duty of good
faith in contract formation.95 One reason contract law excludes the duty of
surprisingly, the term "fault" appears in the Restatement and UCC almost exclusively in connection
with excuse doctrines.
91. See Cohen, Fault Lines, supra note 2.
92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 26, 54, 69. The "reason to know" stan-
dard also appears in other contexts. For example, a party with reason to know of another party's
special needs may have an obligation to take special precautions to protect the other party. See
U.C.C. § 2-315 (stating that reason to know creates implied warranty of fitness); id. § 2-715(2)(a)
(stating that seller's reason to know of buyer's general or particular requirements and needs makes
seller potentially liable for consequential damages); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 351 (1) ("reason to foresee" standard).
93. See, e.g., McGurn v. Bell Microproducts, Inc., 284 F.3d 86(lst Cir. 2002) (remanding for
factual findings on whether employer accepted employee's counteroffer by silence under § 69 be-
cause it knew or had reason to know that employee had written counteroffer on employer's original
offer and returned it to employer).
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26.
95. See U.C.C. § 1-203; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. c.
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good faith from formation is to allow parties to misrepresent certain infor-
mation about themselves to protect their private information and their
investment in that information, thereby enabling them to obtain a larger
share of the contractual surplus.
Once again, however, a rule that seems designed to preclude fault con-
siderations instead merely defines the boundaries of such considerations.
Other doctrines deter parties from opportunistically abusing other kinds of
information in the contract formation process. For example, one party can-
not mislead the other about the likelihood of a deal to obtain more time to
evaluate the deal.96 Nor can one person use negotiations to extract and then
expropriate beneficial information from another without paying for it.
97
A final example from formation doctrine is the concept of "justice" in
98
reliance doctrines. Reliance doctrines developed to thwart what courts per-
ceived to be opportunistic attempts by promisors to escape liability through
strict interpretations of various formation doctrines: consideration, offer and
acceptance, and the statute of frauds.99 But as is well understood, promisee
reliance does not itself prove promisor opportunism. And reliance-based
liability itself can lead to opportunistic investments in or assertions of reli-
ance by promisees. So once again, contract doctrine provides an outlet for
making relative fault assessments, by limiting the application of reliance
doctrines to situations in which "justice" requires enforcement.
VII. THE INEVITABILITY OF FAULT
Even if one disagrees with my conclusions that fault often comports
with mutual intent and believes that contract doctrine should be revised to
reduce further or eliminate entirely the role of fault in contract law, there is
an additional problem with a systematic strict liability regime: it cannot
work. Law is an inherently normative enterprise of which judges are a part.
Judges are not automatons; they exercise judgment, which includes making
normative assessments like fault. Fault is a metric by which courts assess the
gap between formalist concepts and normative reality.
Coase emphasized that parties can often contract around unwanted legal
rules.1°° But we sometimes forget the parallel legal-realist lesson (the Court
96. See, e.g., Markov v. ABC Transfer & Storage Co., 457 P.2d 535 (Wash. 1969) (involving
a tort action of misrepresentation based on promise of lease renewal made while promisor was look-
ing to sell the premises).
97. See, e.g., Reeves v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 56 P.3d 660 (Alaska 2002) (finding im-
plied contract where promoter disclosed idea for visitor center in return for confidentiality or
participation in project).
98. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 84(2)(b), 87 cmt. e, 89, 90, 129, 139(1).
In performance doctrine, the rules regarding conditions and material breach speak of "forfeiture"
rather than reliance, but the idea is similar. Id. §§ 227, 229, 241. In remedy doctrine, the foreseeabil-
ity limitation on expectation damages also contains a "justice" limitation, id. § 351(3), as do the
remedial provisions for mistake, id. § 158(2), and impracticability, id. § 272(2).
99. See generally Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation
of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52 (1981).
100. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960).
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Theorem, perhaps?): courts can often find ways to exercise discretion. In
contract cases, courts can incorporate fault judgments by interpreting con-
tract terms, manipulating contract doctrine, or using legal doctrines outside
of contract, such as tort. Game theorists fail to capture this phenomenon
because they model courts as setting the rules the parties play by and then
largely disappearing from the scene.'O' In reality, courts as well as contract-
ing parties are players in an ongoing game. Different judges (and the same
judge in different cases) will of course vary in their inclinations toward strict
liability or fault approaches. But sooner or later, fault will out.
CONCLUSION: A ROLE FOR STRICT LIABILITY, AND FAULT
Although I have argued that the strict liability view of contract law
needs to be significantly qualified, I recognize the source of the strict liabil-
ity impulse. That impulse is strongest when a persuasive story of
presumptive promisor fault exists. For example, strict liability seems natural
in debt contracts and contracts for the sale of goods. We are comfortable
interpreting these contracts as allocating the risk of changes in financial cir-
cumstances or market price, or requiring perfect tender, in large part because
of the assumption of easy promisor substitutability. These situations are cer-
tainly not trivial in contract law. Nevertheless, they are far from describing
the full spectrum of contract disputes. Even in goods cases, the conditions
for strict liability are often not satisfied. In those situations, we should ex-
pect to see, and do see, courts incorporating fault standards into contract
law.
In short, calling contract law a strict liability system emphasizes its
commitment to deterring promisor fault. But strict liability, like other con-
tract rules, is merely a fault-based presumption. We may reasonably
disagree about how strong the presumption is or ought to be. But determin-
ing the limits of that presumption inevitably means considering why parties
do not perform their contracts, in other words, fault.
Scholars and courts should embrace and help shape the fault that lies
within our contract law, rather than theorize as if it does not or should not
exist.
101. See generally Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades:
Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829 (2003) (summarizing game theoretic models of contract).
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